Hamas v. Hamas voters
I really don't think that those who voted for Hamas voted for the destruction of Israel and for terrorism. They voted against corruption.
Can the PA reform? And what should do with Hamas in the meantime?
Here are a few thoughts from Foreign Policy Magazine:
http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3360
Getting Real With Hamas
By Nathan J. Brown
Posted February 2006
If President Bush and the European Union demand too much, too soon from Hamas, the effort could backfire and make things worse for the Palestinians, Israelis, and Western diplomacy.
End to aid? The United States and European Union have threatened to cut off funding to the Palestinian Authority.
Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images
In Washington and Brussels, Hamas’s landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections poses an immediate dilemma: what to do with all the funding for the Palestinian Authority? Although they are still coordinating their positions, the United States and European Union are leaning toward linking financial support to fundamental changes by the triumphant Islamist movement. In his January 31 State of the Union address, President Bush said “[T]he leaders of Hamas must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for lasting peace.”
The conditions are reasonable enough, but they must be accompanied by careful thinking about how to measure compliance and progress. Setting conditions on Hamas may force it to confront difficult choices, but pressure applied clumsily will easily backfire. Just as bad, the United States and Europe could get handcuffed to a policy they will find it difficult to extricate themselves from later.
Cutting off funding entirely is a bad option that may provoke economic collapse and humanitarian disaster in the West Bank and Gaza. The demise of the Palestinian Authority would result in a leaderless society in a continuous state of low-level warfare with Israel. Islamists in the region who have argued in favor of democratic change will find themselves unable to answer the charge that the international community will never accept Islamist parties in power. It’s possible, alternatively, that Hamas would stave of fiscal collapse by turning to Iran and Saudi Arabia for funding—an alignment hardly likely to serve either U.S. or Israeli interests.
Accommodating a Hamas-led government and keeping international aid flowing may be more effective—but only if it supports the long-term goal of peace. Is that possible? Or is the group’s agenda simply too extreme? Hamas, after all, rejects a two-state solution and maintains a right to resistance—and the group’s definition of resistance includes murderous attacks on civilian targets.
Therefore, conditioning aid is a sound approach. Still, presenting demands for immediate change in stark and aggressive terms will likely elicit only resistance. Hamas is a movement that prides itself on its principles and is unlikely to abandon them easily. Even if some of its leaders wanted to shift positions, the movement’s ponderous decision-making structures would make it difficult to do so in the face of outside pressure. Any change in Hamas will likely be gradual.
As much as possible, the West should allow pressures from within the Arab and Muslim world to work. It’s important to recognize that the Palestinians themselves may demand a more moderate approach to Israel. Hamas is extremely sensitive to Palestinian public opinion and recognizes that the majority of voters actually favored parties supporting a two-state solution. (Hamas’s electoral campaign avoided mention of its hard-line position on Israel.) Other mainstream Islamist groups in the region—looking to Palestine as a test case—are unlikely to criticize (and may even cheer) a moderation of the Hamas position if it demonstrates that Islamists can govern effectively.
But if Hamas will not repudiate its position on Israel and terrorism immediately, what realistic benchmarks might be used to judge its moderation? What sort of steps might assure Israelis that a viable negotiating process is possible despite the Hamas landslide?
The demand that Hamas recognize Israel can be converted into several different formulas, some of which Hamas leaders have hinted (but only hinted) might be acceptable. For instance, Hamas might allow moderate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Israel as he pleases, with any resulting agreement subject to a referendum. Or it might allow the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO, Israel’s formal negotiating partner) to bargain with Israel, with any final agreement subject to approval by the body that oversees the PLO, the Palestine National Council. These mechanisms would allow Hamas to hold to its positions while still bowing to political realities.
None of these approaches offers guaranteed success, and the prospects for failure are substantial. But there will be plenty of time to deal with the consequences of failure. All players should now avoid locking themselves into positions they will regret later. If prospects for Arab democracy, democratic Islamic political movements, and Israeli-Palestinian peace are to survive the Hamas landslide victory, creative benchmarks rather than rigid slogans must be the guide.
Nathan J. Brown is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, professor of political science at George Washington University, and author of Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords. He served as an observer for the Palestinian elections as a member of the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center team.
Can the PA reform? And what should do with Hamas in the meantime?
Here are a few thoughts from Foreign Policy Magazine:
http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3360
Getting Real With Hamas
By Nathan J. Brown
Posted February 2006
If President Bush and the European Union demand too much, too soon from Hamas, the effort could backfire and make things worse for the Palestinians, Israelis, and Western diplomacy.
End to aid? The United States and European Union have threatened to cut off funding to the Palestinian Authority.
Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images
In Washington and Brussels, Hamas’s landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections poses an immediate dilemma: what to do with all the funding for the Palestinian Authority? Although they are still coordinating their positions, the United States and European Union are leaning toward linking financial support to fundamental changes by the triumphant Islamist movement. In his January 31 State of the Union address, President Bush said “[T]he leaders of Hamas must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for lasting peace.”
The conditions are reasonable enough, but they must be accompanied by careful thinking about how to measure compliance and progress. Setting conditions on Hamas may force it to confront difficult choices, but pressure applied clumsily will easily backfire. Just as bad, the United States and Europe could get handcuffed to a policy they will find it difficult to extricate themselves from later.
Cutting off funding entirely is a bad option that may provoke economic collapse and humanitarian disaster in the West Bank and Gaza. The demise of the Palestinian Authority would result in a leaderless society in a continuous state of low-level warfare with Israel. Islamists in the region who have argued in favor of democratic change will find themselves unable to answer the charge that the international community will never accept Islamist parties in power. It’s possible, alternatively, that Hamas would stave of fiscal collapse by turning to Iran and Saudi Arabia for funding—an alignment hardly likely to serve either U.S. or Israeli interests.
Accommodating a Hamas-led government and keeping international aid flowing may be more effective—but only if it supports the long-term goal of peace. Is that possible? Or is the group’s agenda simply too extreme? Hamas, after all, rejects a two-state solution and maintains a right to resistance—and the group’s definition of resistance includes murderous attacks on civilian targets.
Therefore, conditioning aid is a sound approach. Still, presenting demands for immediate change in stark and aggressive terms will likely elicit only resistance. Hamas is a movement that prides itself on its principles and is unlikely to abandon them easily. Even if some of its leaders wanted to shift positions, the movement’s ponderous decision-making structures would make it difficult to do so in the face of outside pressure. Any change in Hamas will likely be gradual.
As much as possible, the West should allow pressures from within the Arab and Muslim world to work. It’s important to recognize that the Palestinians themselves may demand a more moderate approach to Israel. Hamas is extremely sensitive to Palestinian public opinion and recognizes that the majority of voters actually favored parties supporting a two-state solution. (Hamas’s electoral campaign avoided mention of its hard-line position on Israel.) Other mainstream Islamist groups in the region—looking to Palestine as a test case—are unlikely to criticize (and may even cheer) a moderation of the Hamas position if it demonstrates that Islamists can govern effectively.
But if Hamas will not repudiate its position on Israel and terrorism immediately, what realistic benchmarks might be used to judge its moderation? What sort of steps might assure Israelis that a viable negotiating process is possible despite the Hamas landslide?
The demand that Hamas recognize Israel can be converted into several different formulas, some of which Hamas leaders have hinted (but only hinted) might be acceptable. For instance, Hamas might allow moderate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Israel as he pleases, with any resulting agreement subject to a referendum. Or it might allow the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO, Israel’s formal negotiating partner) to bargain with Israel, with any final agreement subject to approval by the body that oversees the PLO, the Palestine National Council. These mechanisms would allow Hamas to hold to its positions while still bowing to political realities.
None of these approaches offers guaranteed success, and the prospects for failure are substantial. But there will be plenty of time to deal with the consequences of failure. All players should now avoid locking themselves into positions they will regret later. If prospects for Arab democracy, democratic Islamic political movements, and Israeli-Palestinian peace are to survive the Hamas landslide victory, creative benchmarks rather than rigid slogans must be the guide.
Nathan J. Brown is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, professor of political science at George Washington University, and author of Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords. He served as an observer for the Palestinian elections as a member of the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center team.
posted by Wendy at 12:30 PM
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